Transposition Strategy and Political Time in the Europeanisation of Social Norms: Comparing Transposition of the Anti-discrimination Directives in Germany and Austria by 網谷 龍介
1. Introduction
As the European Union has expanded its
radius of action throughout the 1990s beyond 
construction of an international market, stud-
ies on European integration have taken notice 
of the profound political changes in the Mem-
ber States. Thus, Europeanisation has become 
one of the most widely researched topics since 
the 1990s.
Europeanisation studies have focused pri-
marily on ‘goodness of fit’. According to this 
proposition (Börzel and Risse 2000; Cowles, 
Caporaso and Risse 2001), the greater the dif-
ference between the policy chosen at the Euro-
pean level and the existing policy in a Member 
State, the harder pressed is the Member State 
to change the policy and the greater is the dif-
ficulty facing the Member State. From this per-
spective, it is expected that Member States fail 
or delay the transposition of European Union 
directives when the ‘fit’ is worse.
Acknowledging its value as a first step and 
initial stimulation for Europeanisation studies, 
it has become also commonplace to point out 
the analytical and empirical weaknesses of 
goodness of fit and to illuminate the way for-
ward 1. This study, too, starts from the stand-
ard ‘goodness of fit’ viewpoint and compares 
the transposition of anti-discrimination direc-
tives in Germany and Austria based on the 
‘most similar’ case design. Through this com-
parison, I aim to show two types of lacunae in 
the ‘goodness of fit’ model.
First, most Europeanisation studies have 
chosen the ‘policy’ level as the empirical foun-
dation. Several scholars such as Vivien A. 
Schmidt have also attempted to examine Euro-
peanisation at the ‘polity’ level. However, there 
are few works on the Europeanisation of ‘poli-
tics’. This paper tries to fill the gap, specifically 
by showing that domestic political time is now 
constrained by European-level political time, 
and the incumbent is forced to deal with issues 
that they would otherwise want to shelve (cf. 
Ekengren 2002).
Second, ‘goodness of fit’ does not explain 
the differences between Germany and Austria 
in the transposition of anti-discrimination di-
rectives. Contrary to the usual expectation, the 
German ‘left’ red-green government failed to 
transpose the directives, while the Austrian 
‘right’ blue-black government, including the 
right-populist Freedom Party, transposed them 
with less delay. To explain this puzzle, we 
should include the ‘politics’ dimension in the 
analysis, especially political time and the 
transposition strategies of governments (cf. 
Treib 2003). In other words, domestic actors do 
not simply react to Europeanisation pressures 
on the basis of economic or technical cost-bene-
fit calculations. Rather, Europeanisation pres-
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2sures occasionally serve as a political resource, 
and this complicates the domestic process of 
Europeanisation.
In the following section, I review briefly 
why and how the anti-discrimination directives 
were enacted at the European level. Then, I ex-
amine the ‘failure’ of transposition under the 
Schröder red-green coalition government 
(1998–2005) in the third section, which is the 
main part of the paper. In the fourth section, I 
present a shorter analysis of the transposition 
process in Austria. Throughout the compara-
tive reconstruction of the political processes of 
transposition, I focus on how the two govern-
ments locate the directives in their overall po-
litical strategies. In the last section, I summa-
rise the empirical evidence and the arguments.
2.  Emergence of the ‘anti-discrimination 
policy field’ at the European level
In June 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam, a 
revision of the Treaty on the European Union 
(Maastricht Treaty), was signed, and it came 
into effect on May 1, 1999. This treaty marked 
a significant advance in the social policy do-
main, mainly by incorporating the Social Pro-
tocol, which was agreed and signed by all 
Member States except the United Kingdom 
during the Maastricht Treaty negotiation.
One of the most notable changes is found in 
the anti-discrimination policy. Article 13 of the 
Consolidated Version of Treaty Establishing 
the European Community (97/C 340/03) now 
confers Union competence prohibiting discrimi-
nation, stating
Without prejudice to the other provisions of 
this Treaty and within the limits of the 
powers conferred by it upon the Communi-
ty, the Council, acting unanimously on a 
proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the European Parliament, may 
take appropriate action to combat discrim-
ination based on sex, racial or ethnic ori-
gin, religion or belief, disability, age or 
sexual orientation.
This article was an innovation in European so-
cial policy, for it not only expanded Europe-lev-
el social policy competence beyond the Maas-
tricht Treaty but also far exceeded the Social 
Protocol, which covered merely “equality be-
tween men and women with regard to labour 
market opportunities and treatment at work” 
(Article 2 of the protocol on social policy) and 
specifically obliged the eleven Member States 
to “ensure equality between men and women 
with regard to labour market opportunities and 
treatment at work” (Article 6).
Based on this newly endowed competence, 
the European Commission issued a package of 
anti-discrimination policy proposals. This 
package comprises a Communication introduc-
ing the proposals (COM(1999) 564 final), pro-
posal for a Council Directive establishing a 
general framework for equal treatment in em-
ployment and occupation (COM(1999) 565 fi-
nal), proposal for a Council Directive imple-
menting the principle of equal treatment be-
tween persons irrespective of racial or ethnic 
origin (COM(1999) 566 final) and proposal for a 
Council Decision establishing a Community 
Action Programme to combat discrimination 
2001–2006 (COM(1999) 567 final). These pro-
posals were handled quickly, and two direc-
tives were already adopted within a year. The 
Racial Equality Directive (2000/43/EC) was 
signed on June 29th and the Employment 
Equality Directive on November 27th, 2000.
Among these policy proposals, the Racial 
Equality Directive was very important, as Bell 
(2002: 384) says, “[i]t does not seem an over-
statement to describe this instrument as one of 
the most significant pieces of social legislation 
recently adopted by the European Union”. In 
addition, it is noteworthy that the directive 
passed quickly through the complicated EU 
legislative machinery, which was remarked 
upon as ‘world-record adoption’ by Geddes and 
Guiraudon (2004: 334).
Why was it possible? Several factors led to 
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swift adoption (Geddes and Guiraudon, 2004). 
First, it was enacted when the democratic value 
of the Union was questioned by participation of 
the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), headed by 
Jörg Haider, in the Government. The other 
fourteen Member States warned Austria by de-
claring that they would not accept any bilateral 
official contacts at the political level with an 
Austrian government including the FPÖ, which 
had no effect on coalition formation. In addi-
tion, the French, Belgian, and Italian Minis-
ters issued a joint position paper calling for 
swift adoption of the Commission’s anti-dis-
crimination proposals. Given the link between 
the anti-discrimination directives and the Aus-
trian populist right, it was not possible politi-
cally for the Austrian and the German red-
green governments to slow down the legislative 
process, and France became a motor of the leg-
islation, although the ‘fit’ between the proposal 
and her own policy paradigm was bad. It 
should also be added that the composition of 
the Council was exceptionally ‘left’-leaning at 
the time (Manow, Schäfer and Zorn 2004), after 
establishment of the Labour Government (May 
1997) in the UK, electoral victory of the Parti 
socialiste in the 1997 French National Assem-
bly election (June 1997) and the end of the six-
teen-year-long Kohl Government and its suc-
cession by the Schröder red-green coalition 
government (October 1998) in Germany.
Second, Non-governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) have played an important role in push-
ing for and framing the anti-discrimination di-
rectives. Among them, Starting Line Group 
(SLG), a network of more than 250 pro-migrant 
NGOs with strong Anglo-Dutch intellectual in-
fluences, was active in Amsterdam Treaty ne-
gotiations for inclusion of the anti-discrimina-
tion article. On the contrary, the French and 
the German pro-migrant organisations showed 
little interest in EU-level developments. Thus, 
the arguments pressing for anti-discrimination 
policy proposals at the EU level drew inspira-
tion and guidance mainly from British and 
Dutch experiences.
Third, although these directives were leg-
islative acts exploring a new area, it was possi-
ble to make use of existing policy assets (Tyson 
2001). The Equal Treatment Directive of 9 Feb-
ruary 1976 on the implementation of the princi-
ple of equal treatment for men and women as 
regards access to employment, vocational 
training and promotion, and working condi-
tions (Council Directive 76/207/EEC); the Bur-
den of Proof Directive (Council Directive 97/80/
EC) and the case-law of the Court of the Euro-
pean Commissions (ECJ) had served as solid 
bases of negotiation and clarified several con-
ceptual problems in advance. The Member 
States could negotiate with technically accus-
tomed terms and arguments.
Yet, legislation of this magnitude was not 
easy. One of the controversial issues was the 
material scope of application (Tyson 2001, 207-
209). There was broad agreement on the need 
for anti-discrimination regulations concerning 
employment relations, but the proposal further 
dealt with other areas usually covered by the 
Civil Code. Especially debated was Article 3 
concerning provision and access to goods and 
services. A few noted that community compe-
tence was limited to transnational situations, 
while others insisted that the directive should 
not cover situations such as a person privately 
selling a bicycle to a neighbour. This problem 
was solved in the COREPER (Committee of 
Permanent Representatives) negotiation by 
limiting application of the directive to those 
goods and services ‘which are available to the 
public’. As will be shown below, this clarifica-
tion did not suffice to prevent the attack on the 
German transposition process.
The legislative process reviewed above il-
luminates two points. First, because the anti-
discrimination directives were framed under 
Anglo-Dutch influences, ‘fit’ between the direc-
tives and the existing policies was not good ei-
ther in Germany or in Austria. Second, such 
European legislation was possible with excep-
tional political moment concerning the political 
situation in Austria.
4These points lead us to expect difficulty in 
transposition, both in Germany and in Austria. 
The next two sections examine the actual legis-
lative processes and the results of transposi-
tion.
3. Transposition ‘failure’ in Germany
3-1.  Contextual background of German domestic 
politics: red-green initiatives on minority pro-
tection and their political repercussions
(1) Policy positions of Coalition Government
As is shown above, the anti-discrimination 
directives were modelled on British legisla-
tions. In Germany, gender equality had been an 
important issue both politically and legally, but 
other types of discrimination were rather ne-
glected and received no specific legal or politi-
cal treatment. Except for a few clauses in the 
Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsge-
setz), discrimination was covered only by the 
general clauses in the Civil Code, based on the 
Article 3 of the German Basic Law stipulating 
equality before the law (EIRO 2004a). This ar-
ticle prohibits discrimination on grounds other 
than gender, stating “[n]o person shall be fa-
voured or disfavoured because of sex, parent-
age, race, language, homeland and origin, 
faith, or religious or political opinions. No per-
son shall be disfavoured because of disability”. 
It means that the transposition of the direc-
tives had to break new ground in Germany’s 
system of laws.
The directives were to be transposed under 
the Schröder red-green government, which had 
defeated the Christian Democrats–Free Dem-
ocrats alliance in the September 1998 election. 
The former can be called the first ‘leftist’ gov-
ernment in Germany, composed of the Social 
Democrats and the Greens, in comparison with 
the previous Social Democrats-led governments 
with the Free Democrats as the junior partner. 
If we consider the general ideological affin-
ity of the directives and partywise-political 
composition of the governments, leftist govern-
ments are, ceteris paribus, supposed to be better 
suited for implementing such a policy. In fact, 
both parties , Social Democrats and the Greens, 
presented a proposal on minority protection in 
1998. To analyse the political process of trans-
position, however, we have to determine the ac-
tual policy positions at that time. To this end, I 
first examine the electoral programmes of both 
parties.
The electoral programme of the Social 
Democrats (Arbeit, Innovation und Gerechtig-
keit. SPD-Programm für die Bundestagswahl 
1998) emphasised the need to revitalise the 
economy, as is evident from its title ‘Work, In-
novation and Justice’. As for anti-discrimina-
tion policy, it merely touched upon gender 
equality. In addition, a section was dedicated to 
the immigration issue, declaring that “the core 
of successful integration policy is the enact-
ment of modern citizenship law”.
In contrast, the Greens paid more atten-
tion to the issues at hand. In its electoral pro-
gramme ‘Green is the Change’ (Programm zur 
Bundestagswahl 98. Grün ist der Wechsel), a 
section ‘Self-determination’ dealt with the is-
sue. Here, not only gender equality but also 
equal treatment of disabled people, foreign na-
tionals and asylum seekers were aimed at, 
based on the principle of self-determination in 
one’s life. Under the heading ‘empowering mi-
norities’, discrimination against homosexuals 
was criticised and introduction of same-sex 
marriage or equal treatment of non-marriage 
partnership were proposed. Moreover, the need 
for a specific anti-discrimination law was stat-
ed explicitly, in anticipation of development at 
the European level.
Overall, it is safe to say that anti-discrimi-
nation was the Greens’ issue. Then, how was it 
reflected in the policy of the red-green Coali-
tion Government?
The Coalition Agreement of October 20, 
1998, ref lected the stance of the Greens. In 
Chapter 9 ‘Security for All, Empowering Citi-
zenship’, revision of the existing citizenship law 
was agreed upon with concrete conditions for 
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acquiring citizenship (Section 7). Furthermore, 
the chapter had a separate section on ‘Minority 
Rights’ (Section 10), where it was declared that
We will set out a law against discrimina-
tion and to encourage equal treatment (es-
pecially by introduction of the legal instru-
ment of registered life-partnership with 
rights and obligations). The recommenda-
tions of the European Parliament for the 
equal treatment of lesbians and gays is 
given consideration.
It is remarkable that anti-discrimination issues 
beyond gender equality were recognised for-
mally as a task for the new government. More-
over, the link to European-level policy develop-
ment is stated clearly.
The Agreement showed the Greens’ influ-
ence in this field. Nevertheless, the post of 
Minister of Justice, who deals with the issue, 
went to a Social Democrat, Herta Däubler-
Gmelin, who was seconded by another Social 
Democrat as State Secretary.
(2) ‘Trauma’ of citizenship law reform
As is expected from the analysis of the 
electoral programmes and the Coalition Agree-
ment, among minority protection issues, the 
new government first tackled the issue of citi-
zenship law (Hell 2005). The draft revision of 
citizenship law, released by the Ministry of In-
terior, was path-breaking. First, it proposed 
conferring German citizenship on children born 
in Germany to non-German parents, which is a 
departure from the jus sanguine principle fol-
lowed since 1913. Second, with introduction of 
the jus soli principle, the draft revision official-
ly accepted dual citizenship for the first time.
The Christian Democrats, now going to the 
opposition bench and anticipating this move, 
had already presented a proposal in the Feder-
al Council (Upper House) on restricting the 
number of immigrants in November 1998. 
Against the proposal of the Government and 
with a view to electoral exploitation of the issue 
in the approaching Hesse state election (Febru-
ary 1999), the Christian Democrats launched a 
massive signature campaign against the revi-
sion proposal, which was quite exceptional for 
the Christian Democrats, who are generally 
hesitant to employ such ‘direct democratic’ 
methods. They focussed their attack on the du-
al-citizenship issue and gathered 400,000 sig-
natures in three weeks.
The result of the election on February 7 
was literally shocking. The opinion polls at the 
last minute had predicted 41~2% for the Social 
Democrats and 8.5%~10% for the Greens, 
against 36~9% for the Christian Democrats 
and 5.5%~8% for the Free Democrats, which 
meant clear victory for the incumbent red-
green Government Coalition. Nevertheless, the 
Christian Democrats obtained 43.4% of the 
vote and formed a coalition government with 
the Free Democrats, which barely exceeded the 
electoral threshold with 5.1% of the vote. The 
Social Democrats with 39.4% gained 1.2% 
against the previous election, but the Greens 
suffered a heavy loss of 4% to 7.2%. This elec-
tion was shocking not only for its unexpected 
result but also for its implication of federal poli-
tics. With the turnover of government in Hesse, 
the Schröder Government lost its majority in 
the Federal Council only after four months 
since its investiture. Now the government had 
to solicit the assent of the state government, 
including the opposition parties at the federal 
level.
In the case of citizenship law, the Govern-
ment decided to negotiate with the Free Demo-
crats, which had formed a coalition government 
with the Social Democrats in Rhineland-Pala-
tine. In concession to them, the ‘option model’ 
was introduced, which obliges the holders of 
dual-citizenship to choose one by their 23rd 
birthday. Through this concession, non-recog-
nition of dual-citizenship was maintained, and 
the practical impact of the reform was halved. 
The revised law was adopted with the vote of 
the Social Democrats, the Greens, a part of the 
Democratic Socialists and the Free Democrats.
6The reform of the citizenship law should is 
the first innovation of the new Government 
showing its distinctiveness from the previous 
Kohl Government. It was also expected that 
non-Germans, mainly Turks, who had newly 
acquired citizenship, would become the reser-
voir of left voters. In the end, however, both 
calculations turned out wrong. The defeat in 
Hesse was a severe blow to the Government 
both symbolically and substantially. With this 
negative lesson, the Social Democrats’ became 
more cautious in handling of the minority pro-
tection issue, which was agreed upon in the 
Coalition Agreement.
(3) Same-sex marriage
The next issue the Government tried to re-
solve was the problem of same-sex marriage. In 
line with the Coalition Agreement, the Minis-
ter of Interior Däubler-Gmelin had already an-
nounced in September 1999 that a legislative 
proposal would be released soon. Because of in-
tra-coalition negotiation, actual submission of 
the proposal to the Federal Diet was delayed 
until July 2000. 
Against this proposal, the Central Com-
mittee of German Catholics declared that the 
proposal was unconstitutional because it tres-
passes the special protection accorded to mar-
riage and family by Article 6 of the Basic Law. 
The Christian Democrats made clear their in-
tentions to appeal to the Federal Constitutional 
Court against the constitutionality of the law. 
The law was divided into two parts, of which 
one part required assent of the Federal Council 
and the other did not, and both parts passed 
through the Federal Diet in November 2000. 
However, the Federal Council majority refused 
to give assent to the bill, and the conciliation 
commissions of both Houses could not reach an 
agreement.
The other part of the law, now called the 
‘Life-partnership Law’, came into effect in Au-
gust 2001. The three Christian Democrats-led 
State Governments, namely Bavaria, Saxony 
and Thuringia, questioned its constitutionality 
in the Federal Constitutional Court. However, 
the Court rejected the appeal in July 2002 and 
declared the bill constitutional.
These two cases of minority protection leg-
islations reveal the politically sensitive nature 
of the issue. Both minority protection initia-
tives were politicised by the opposition, defeat-
ed partly or forced concession by veto of the 
Federal Council. Furthermore, it became clear 
that the minority protection issues could be-
come a political liability rather than an asset in 
electoral terms. Therefore, subtle handling and 
scheduling of the issue by the Government was 
needed.
3-2.  Lacking political time and avoidance of leg-
islative acts: The first Schröder Government
As is shown above, two initial minority 
protection initiatives by the Schröder Govern-
ment faced sheer opposition by the Christian 
Democrats, and settlement of the issues took a 
long time. Political time remaining for further 
initiatives in this area, namely transposition of 
anti-discrimination directives, was already 
scarce. It was all the more so because the anti-
discrimination issue would likely arouse in-
tense opposition from the Christian Democrats 
and the Churches, and political complication 
was almost unavoidable.
The Ministry of Justice distributed the 
first draft of the anti-discrimination law in De-
cember 2001. This draft was an ambitious one, 
going beyond mere implementation of the direc-
tives and applying the Racial Equality Direc-
tive to other grounds of discrimination than 
race or ethnic origins. By this expansion, the 
draft aimed to respond to criticism against the 
directive itself.
The draft was criticised heavily by lawyers 2. 
For example, Franz-Jürgen Säcker, Law Pro-
fessor at the Free University of Berlin, wrote 
an article entitled ‘Reason instead of Freedom: 
The Republic of Virtue by the Jacobins’. In it, 
he stated that securing civic liberties through 
separation of State and Society was one of the 
most important achievements of modern West-
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ern civilisation and attacked the draft law as 
an intrusion to the freedom of contract, which 
reminded him of the ‘new puritan regime of 
virtue’. Concretely, he raised several hypotheti-
cal questions. Is a Muslim family allowed to 
rent a room to other Muslims by way of news-
paper inserts? Can a believer of a religion pro-
hibiting homosexuality refuse to rent a house 
to a homosexual? Citing these examples, he 
criticised the draft law as an intervention in 
the ‘plurality of lifestyles and traditions’ (Säck-
er 2002). In the same vein, Eduard Picker, Pro-
fessor at the University of Tübingen, criticised 
the fact that the draft poured morals into law 
and that a certain degree of ‘discrimination’ 
was inevitable as the other side of private au-
tonomy (Picker 2003). Furthermore, Karl-
Heinz Ladeur, a well-known post-modernist 
public law Professor, attacked draft saying it 
discriminated against the ‘majority’ by ignor-
ing the legal rationality of liberal society and 
that it was not only unconstitutional but also 
against common sense and the rule of law (La-
deur 2002).
All of these criticisms were aimed at the 
directive itself, although they did attack the 
expanded scope of application by the German 
government on the surface. Although the ex-
tension aimed by the Government was, first, 
personal scope of application, which included 
discrimination based not only on race but also 
religion and sexual orientations, and, second, 
the responsibility of employers in the case of 
discrimination against an employee, most fun-
damental criticisms were directed at such 
points as shifting the burden of proof, interven-
tion of support groups in legal actions and state 
intervention in the sphere of the Civil Code it-
self. However, these elements were already in-
cluded in the original Racial Equality Direc-
tive. In fact, critics such as Picker attacked the 
explicitly the directive itself saying, “against 
such directive that sticks to the legislation of a 
certain law under the hegemony of Europe, we 
should counter with all legal measures” and 
“the people who get accustomed to appeal to the 
Federal Constitutional Court in case of un-
wanted legislation, should not train themselves 
in fatalism to the European directives, which 
do not suit them” (Picker 2003) 3.
Although Picker was an extreme case, 
most German lawyers’ negative reactions were 
rooted in the bad ‘fit’ of the directives with 
Germany’s system of laws. In their under-
standing, the anti-discrimination problema-
tique could be handled properly by the existing 
laws and judgements, as Picker wrote, “Special 
legislation for anti-discrimination is, in fact, 
unnecessary for the German Civil Code. Euro-
pean criteria are already achieved in Germany, 
in the proper interpretation of laws”. They 
thought that the legal instrument of indirect 
application of the basic rights clauses in Ger-
man Basic Law was sufficient. Furthermore, 
the cognitive schema of state-society division, 
in which ‘society’ is the sphere of freedom logi-
cally prior to the state, has been influential in 
German legal discourse. With this schema, it is 
only natural that the lawyers were discomfort-
ed by state intervention in the sphere of Civil 
Code.
The lawyers’ criticism played a role in the 
opposition to the anti-discrimination law. The 
main sources of opposition were employers and 
 2 For the arguments against the anti-discrimination laws, see Ladeur (2002), Picker (2003), Reichhold (2003), 
Säcker (2002), Schieck (2003), Wiedemann (2002). For the arguments favouring said laws, see Baer (2002), Stölt-
ing (2003), Vennemann (2002) and various articles in Loccumer Protokolle, 40/03 (2003), 71/03 (2003), 79/04 
(2004) among others. See also the discussion at the 2004 Congress of German Public Law Scholars (Veröffentli-
chungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer, 64(2005), 298-435).
 3 Herms and Meinel (2004) wrote “The fundamental problem in Germany lies in the collision of the implementation 
of European laws and the highly differentiated labour law. …For the nature of the draft law is rooted the criteria 
of the European laws, those who insist on the mitigation of anti-discrimination regulations can only raise their 
voice to influence the political institutions at the European level”.
8churches. Especially, both Catholic and 
Evangelical churches objected actively, as they 
perceived the law to infringe upon their 




minierung.html). They had a practical reason, 
too. They feared that under the anti-discrimi-
nation law, they could not give priority to be-
lievers when hiring workers for church-related 
organisations and institutions.
After all, the first draft could not be put on 
the cabinet agenda before the Schröder Gov-
ernment finished its first term. Actually, the 
Minister of Justice prepared the second draft in 
February 2002. Moreover, a few people in the 
Government still expected its enactment before 
the 2002 Election by deleting grounds of dis-
crimination such as age, world-view and reli-
gion from the scope of the law. However, the 
opposition to this law was very fierce (taz, 
18.03.2002; SZ, 09.04.2002; Stork 2005).
In addition, federal politics was in turmoil 
over another minority issue, namely, immigra-
tion law reform. Following the report drawn up 
by the Government Consultative Committee 
(‘Süssmuth-Commission’) in July 2001, the 
Government issued a draft bill in August and 
struck a cabinet-level agreement in November. 
Both the content, which aimed at change in the 
immigration regime by systematically intro-
ducing highly-skilled labour, and the decision 
process, in which the head of the Consultative 
Committee was deliberately chosen from the 
opposition, had been controversial from the 
start. Furthermore, the Social Democrats 
dared a high-handed act at the vote in the Fed-
eral Council, which elicited further criticism 
from the opposition. It was not possible to pass 
any more controversial bills under these cir-
cumstances.
In view of the approaching 2002 Federal 
Diet Election, the Social Democrats gave up on 
sending the bill to the Federal Diet, and trans-
position of the anti-discrimination directives 
was postponed (Pressemitteilung Nr. 297 der 
Bundestagsfraktion Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen; 
SZ, 09.04.2002).
3-3.  Hesitation of Social Democrats: The second 
Schröder Government
In the Federal Diet Election in September 
2002, the Social Democrats barely maintained 
the position of the largest party by a he margin 
of three seats, six thousand in terms of votes, 
against the Christian Democrats, but the red-
green coalition secured a majority in the Federal 
Diet. Therefore, the second Schröder Govern-
ment continued the effort to transpose the direc-
tives in the fifteenth legislative period (2002–
2006). The new Coalition Agreement, entitled 
‘Renewal, Justice and Sustainability’, also in-
cluded a corresponding clause stating, “Based 
on the preparation in the fourteenth legislative 
period, the Government Coalition will send the 
anti-discrimination law to the Diet and trans-
pose the EU directives” (Koalitionsvertrag 
2002–2006: Erneuerung–Gerechtigkeit–Nach-
haltgikeit).
The Greens remained committed to the is-
sue. In their election programme, there was a 
section called ‘Removing Discrimination’, in 
which described their intention to legislate an 
anti-discrimination law by using the directives 
was clearly discernible in the following: “We 
want a comprehensive anti-discrimination law. 
With its help, those who suffered can defend 
themselves against every-day discrimination 
by means of a civil case” (Grün wirkt! Unser 
Wahlprogramm 2002–2006).
By contrast, the electoral programme of 
the Social Democrats treated the minority is-
sue not as an agenda item for the next period 
but as one of the achievements of the previous 
period. While the same-sex life-partnership, 
new citizenship law and immigration laws were 
referred to proudly as evidence of their reform 
capacity, only the gender equality issue was 
cited as one of the aims of the next period. Po-
litically, the minority protection issue was al-
most finished from their viewpoint.
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Reflecting this stance, the newly designat-
ed Minister of Justice Brigitte Zypries took a 
more negative stance towards the anti-discrim-
ination law than her predecessor Däubler-
Gmelin. In March 2003, Zypries was reported 
in one of the quality papers to be negative to-
wards legislating an anti-discrimination law 
(FAZ, 07.03.2003). In fact, she reiterated such 
statements as “the Civil Code is the land of pri-
vate autonomy” or “civic freedoms in the liberal 
state includes …making distinctions and treat-
ing unequally” on official occasions (Zypries 
2003a; 2003b; 2004).
Thus, the legislative work proceeded only 
grudgingly. While the Ministry of Family and 
the Ministry of Economy were pushing for 
transposition, a substantial part of the Social 
Democrats and, most importantly, the Ministry 
of Justice, were negative (Edathy and Sommer 
2004). 
In addition, immigration law continued to 
occupy the political timetable. In December 
2002, the Federal Constitutional Court an-
nulled the March vote in the Federal Council 
and, therefore, the law itself. The Government 
was forced to restart the entire process. After 
the draft was agreed upon by the cabinet in 
January 2003, the Federal Diet passed the bill, 
but the Federal Council vetoed it again, and 
negotiations began in October 2003. The law 
was finally enacted in July 2004.
In the meantime, the due dates for trans-
position of the Racial Equality Directive and 
the Employment Equality Directive, 19 July 
2003 and 2 December 2003, respectively, had 
passed. Although the Ministry of Justice issued 
the new bill in May 2004 and the Government 
Coalition agreed on their final bill in December 
2004, the European Commission initiated an 
infringement procedure and sued Germany in 
the ECJ (EIRO 2004b; 2004c).
The Diet debate began in January 2005. 
The revised bill, too, expanded the scope of ap-
plication, which was in line with the Greens’ 
policy. The Parliamentary Group of the Greens 
convened an expert conference ‘Tailwind from 
Europe’ and projected the directives as provid-
ing an opportunity for developing German an-
ti-discrimination policy.
However, the opposition’s attack remained 
as fierce as before. They criticised the bill as 
posing an uncalculated risk to employers and 
making undue state intervention possible with 
slogans such as ‘intervention in the freedom of 
contract’ or ‘unnecessary bureaucratic mon-
ster’. Their principled opposition was backed up 
by business-oriented and conservative press 
outlets (FTD, 21.1.2005; FAZ, 21.1.2005). The 
Federal Association of Employers held a sympo-
sium ‘Secure the freedom of contract!’, inviting 
Picker as a speaker (BDA 2005). The conserva-
tive newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
attacked the bill as pushing for the ‘leading 
culture (Leitkultur) of the left’ (FAZ, 20.1.2005).
Furthermore, the Government continued 
to be divided on this issue. Renate Künast, the 
Minister of Consumer Protection from the 
Greens, defended the bill, insisting that the bill 
was already aimed at minimum realisation of 
the requests from the EU and that further de-
lay would invite substantial penalty from the 
EU. On the contrary, a few Social Democratic 
Ministers were reluctant to the enactment it-
self and were ready to revise the bill to incorpo-
rate the requests of the opposition (FTD, 
4.3.2005; 5.3.2005).
Here again, electoral concern played a role. 
The harshest criticism of the bill came from 
North Rhine-Westphalia, the largest state in 
Germany, where the State Diet election was 
due in May 2005. The Social Democratic Minis-
ter President of North Rhine-Westphalia Peer 
Steinbrück suggested that he would not vote for 
the bill in the Federal Council because it would 
harm the competitiveness of the firms in his 
State (FTD, 5.3.2005). Harald Schartau, the 
Chairman of the state’s Social Democratic Par-
ty and the Minister of Social and Labour Af-
fairs, also argued against the bill, pointing out 
“Currently, the main concern of the people is 
the insecurity of the jobs and whether they 
have the chance to find a new job… [the anti-
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discrimination law] would not help our electoral 
campaign but damage us” (Die Zeit, 8.3.2005, 
10/2005).
Thus, a heated debate was inevitable, and 
smooth passage of the bill was unlikely. How-
ever, the political situation in Germany 
changed dramatically. The Social Democrats 
lost the State Diet Election, and the coalition of 
the Christian Democrats and the Free Demo-
crats took over the State Government, as was 
expected. Then, Schröder opted for a gamble. 
After an hour, he declared at a press confer-
ence that he had decided to trigger dissolution 
of the Federal Diet and call for an early elec-
tion. This decision was made personally by 
Schröder, and only a few leaders in the Coali-
tion, namely, Steinbrück, Vice Chancellor and 
the Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, and the 
Federal Chairman of the Social Democrats 
Franz Müntefering, were notified before the 
press conference.
The focus of public opinion shifted. Admis-
sibility of the dissolution was first debated; 
then, economic issues such as unemployment, 
economic reflation and budget deficit became 
the central themes of the electoral campaign. 
The anti-discrimination law disappeared com-
pletely from the political foreground.
Now it was possible for the Social Demo-
crats and the Greens to pass the bill without 
fear that they might lose voters at the centre. 
Rather, they should care about the interest of 
core constituencies of both parties. Therefore, 
the Government Coalition passed the bill at the 
Federal Diet with some amendments to accom-
modate the objections from the Churches in 
June. The Federal Council vetoed the bill in 
July, and the Conciliation Committee was held. 
Both sides were not prepared to make conces-
sions, and the negotiation was stopped in Sep-
tember. The anti-discrimination directives 
were not transposed again.
The ECJ recognised the Germans’ breach 
of the treaty obligation and ordered the nation 
to pay the cost for the Racial Equality Directive 
on 28 April 2005 (Commission Press Release, 
IP/05/502) and for the Employment Equality 
Directive on 23 February 2006 (OJ C 131/23, 
3.6.2006). Nine months after installation of the 
new Grand Coalition Government led by Ange-
la Merkel, General Law on Equal Treatment 
(Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz) was fi-
nally enacted on 14 August 2006.
4. Transposition ‘success’ in Austria
Similar to Germany, there was no special 
anti-discrimination law in Austria. Only Arti-
cle 7 of the Federal Constitution prohibited dis-
crimination based on religion or disability 
(EIRO 2004a).
In contrast to Germany, transposition of 
the anti-discrimination directives was borne by 
the rightist Government composed of the 
Christian-conservative People’s Party and the 
right-populist Freedom Party. After the 1999 
election of the National Council, the People’s 
Party leader Wolfgang Schüssel ventured to 
embrace the Freedom Party. Since the 1980s, 
the Freedom Party turned right under populist 
leader Jörg Haider and took an anti-immigra-
tionstance. Thus, we can say that ideological 
affinity between the directives and the Austri-
an government was rather low.
Before transposition of the directives was 
put on the agenda, the anti-discrimination is-
sue had been already discussed in a certain 
circle (Krickler 2003; Solla 2003). The UN year 
of human rights in 1998 accelerated the activi-
ty of NGOs and the six main NGOs, including 
the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Human 
Rights, began drafting the anti-discrimination 
law, which resulted in a comprehensive legisla-
tive proposal in March 2001.
However, the Austrian Government ig-
nored this draft. Its own bill was one of mini-
mum transposition, with several articles adopt-
ed literally from the directives. Although a 
special committee was established in the Na-
tional Council, the Government Coalition was 
said to retard the discussion (ECHO 2003). The 
final Government bill was issued only four days 
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before the transposition deadline, as if it were 
an alibi, and sent to the Parliament on 11 No-
vember 2003. This retardation reflected the in-
tention of the government to minimise politici-
sation and put the opposition under the severe 
time constraints to make fundamental revision 
impossible. The NGOs, Social Democrats and 
Greens protested this tactic.
At the same time, the Government was 
flexible enough to incorporate a few of the criti-
cisms of the opposition and to break the force of 
an objection. Among the 11 points requested by 
the Social Democrats, the Government accept-
ed seven points in full and two in part. For ex-
ample, the original bill contained no clause 
concerning the intervention of NGOs in law-
suits. Responding to a request from the opposi-
tion and the NGOs, a special umbrella organi-
sation called ‘the Litigation Association of 
NGOs against Discrimination’ was established 
and given permission to intervene in lawsuits 
( h t t p : / / w w w. k l a g s v e r b a n d . a t / n e w s .
php?nr=3890). This f lexibility was explained 
partly by the fact that a part of the bill re-
quired constitutional amendment, for which 
two-thirds majority was necessary. The Gov-
ernment needed the assent of the Social Demo-
crats.
Based on these concessions, the Govern-
ment Coalition urged the Social Democrats to 
vote for the bill. The Social Democrats insisted 
that incorporation of the requested 11 points 
was the minimum requirement for complete 
transposition of the directives and further re-
quested the expansion of legal intervention by 
the NGOs and a more complete shift in the 
burden of proof. Although they maintained 
their position and voted against the bill, they 
were made to be defensive. This is partly be-
cause Vienna City Government, governed by 
the Social Democrats, passed its own anti-dis-
crimination law, which also amounted to mini-
mum transposition of the directives. Therefore, 
homosexuality-related NGOs in Vienna criti-
cised the Social Democrats as untrustworthy 
(http://hosiwien.at/?page_id=102). In sum, the 
tactics of the Government were very effective, 
at least against the Social Democrats.
Although the deadline was not met, the 
Federal Anti-discrimination law was passed in 
May 2004. Yet, given the delay in enacting 
State-level legislation for implementing the di-
rectives, Austria, too, was sued by the Commis-
sion. However, Austria avoided the blame for 
lack of transposition of the Employment Equal-
ity Directive.
5.  Comparative Assessment and Theoretical 
Implications
Transposition of the anti-discrimination 
directives ‘failed’ in Germany and was rela-
tively ‘successful’ in Austria, in the sense that 
federal-level measures were enacted, albeit 
with a slight delay. How can we explain these 
results?
In the case of Germany, three factors were 
important. First, the mismatch between the 
directives and the existing legal system con-
tributed to the ‘failure’. Because of the mis-
match at the fundamental level, lawyers in 
Germany attacked the transposition bills and 
the opposition took a firm stance, making the 
transposition politically difficult.
Second, the abovementioned mismatch was 
amplified by the transposition strategy of the 
Government. The Government, ideologically 
close to the directives and mainly pushed by 
the Greens, tried to take a giant step by using 
the opportunity of transposition, which intensi-
fied the resulting confrontation with the oppo-
sition.
Third, given the political explosiveness of 
the issue and head-on confrontation, a relative-
ly long negotiation was inevitable. However, the 
political timetable was overcrowded and al-
ready occupied by other minority-protection is-
sues such as citizenship law and same-sex 
marriage. The Social Democrats could not find 
a time when they would not have to worry 
about the effect of passing the bill on the Hesse 
Election.
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In the case of Austria, there was an objec-
tive mismatch. Because of common legal tradi-
tions, the fundamental legal culture there was 
similar to that in Germany, and Austria, too, 
lacked any specific anti-discrimination legisla-
tion. However, this matter was not politicised.
This difference between the two countries 
arises from the fact that the Austrian Govern-
ment, ideologically distant to the directives but 
unable to refuse them, chose the strategy of 
minimum transposition and was f lexible in 
making tactical concessions to the opposition. 
Thus, the opposition found it difficult to push 
for expansive transposition. Furthermore, the 
Government controlled the political timetable 
skilfully and made fundamental revision diffi-
cult by tabling the bill after the transposition 
deadline.
Now we move on to comparative assess-
ment. First, I examine the factors raised by 
standard Europeanisation models, which are 
focussed on structural variables. The ‘goodness 
of fit’ was low in both Germany and Austria at 
both the fundamental level (legal culture) and 
the concrete level (lack of any anti-discrimina-
tion law). General ideological affinity was high 
in Germany (leftist government) and low in 
Austria (rightist government). Another struc-
tural variable, which measures relative ease of 
policy change, is the number of veto points (cf. 
Tsebelis 1995). According to the veto-player in-
dex by Schmidt (2000), both countries scored 
very high (Germany: 8, Austria: 9). Thus, from 
the structural variables, we can expect trans-
position to be easier in Germany than in Aus-
tria. 
However, in reality, the transposition re-
sults were quite the contrary. Here, political 
variables have a role. The ‘goodness of fit’ vari-
able alone does not suffice for predicting the 
political difficulty of transposition. It should be 
considered in combination with the transposi-
tion strategy of governments, which is deter-
mined not only by policy considerations but also 
by electoral concerns.
In addition, Europeanisation of political 
time has its own independent effect. In the case 
of Germany, the Social Democrats were torn 
between the transposition deadline and the 
scheduling of the domestic agenda. On the con-
trary, the Austrian Government Coalition used 
the transposition deadline as an asset, forcing 
the Social Democrats to choose minimum 
transposition or (further) transposition delay.
The result of the comparative assessment 




goodness of fit low low
ideological affinity high low







scarce (the government 
cannot find the proper 





constraint to minimise 
the opposition)
Transposition Results failure success
Table 1. Summary Score of Variables and Results
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This paper was a preliminary attempt to 
include the ‘politics’ dimension in ‘Europeani-
sation’ research. Further research including 
greater numbers of countries and cases is nec-
essary to evaluate the impact of European In-
tegration on the ‘politics’ in Europe.
* An earlier version of the paper was presented at the 
2005 Annual Meeting of the Japanese Political Sci-
ence Association and the 2007 Conference of the Eu-
ropean Consortium for Political Research.
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